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HELL, VAGUENESS, AND JUSTICE: 
A REPLY TO SIDER
Trent Dougherty and Ted Poston
Ted Sider's paper "Hell and Vagueness" challenges a certain conception of 
Hell by arguing that it is inconsistent with God's justice. Sider's inconsistency 
argument works only when supplemented by additional premises. Key to 
Sider's case is a premise that the properties upon which eternal destinies su­
pervene are "a smear," i.e., they are distributed continuously among individ­
uals in the world. We question this premise and provide reasons to doubt it. 
The doubts come from two sources. The first is based on evidential consider­
ations borrowed from skeptical theism. A related but separate consideration 
is that supposing it would be an insurmountable problem for God to make 
just (and therefore non-arbitrary) distinctions in morally smeared world, God 
thereby has sufficient motivation not to actualize such worlds. Yet God also 
clearly has motivation only to actualize some member of the subset of non- 
smeared worlds which don't appear non-smeared. For if it was obvious who 
was morally fit for Heaven and who wasn't, a new arena of great injustice is 
opened up. The result is that if there is a God, then he has the motivation and 
the ability to actualize from just that set of worlds which are not smeared but 
which are indiscernible from smeared worlds.
Ted Sider's paper "Hell and Vagueness"1 challenges a certain conception 
of Hell by arguing that it is inconsistent with God's justice. Sider's inconsis­
tency argument works only when supplemented by additional premises. 
We lay out the inconsistency argument, supplement it, and then argue 
that one key additional premise—the existence thesis—is unsupported.
The Inconsistency A rgum ent
Sider's aim is to show that several propositions describing the require­
ments of justice and a common conception of Hell are jointly inconsistent. 
First, there are the propositions describing a "binary" conception of the 
afterlife:
Dichotomy (D): there are exactly two states in the afterlife, Heaven and 
Hell.
Badness (B): Hell is much worse than Heaven.
Non-universality (NU): Both Heaven and Hell are populated.
Divine Control (DC): God decides according to some criterion C who 
goes to Heaven and who goes to Hell.
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Second, there are two propositions describing the nature of God and the 
nature of justice.
Divine Justice (DJ): God will not violate the proportional nature of 
justice.
Proportionality (P): Similar cases deserve similar treatment.
These propositions describe what we take to be a sufficiently accurate pic­
ture of one fairly common conception of Hell and the nature of divine 
justice. Yet, these propositions are not inconsistent. A step in the direction 
to inconsistency is to add the following premise.
Borderline (BL): Any application of a just criterion must judge created 
beings according to a standard that comes in degrees or admits of bor­
derline cases.
Sider asserts that this addition to the set of propositions mentioned above 
generates an inconsistency.2 The thought seems to be this. By (NU), (DC), 
(DJ), (BL) and (B) God has decided according to a just criterion that comes 
in degrees that certain individuals are in a much worse condition than 
others. But this conflicts with (P) because some individuals are close to the 
borderline and certain of those individuals go to Hell while others go to 
Heaven. Thus we have an inconsistency.
This explication, though, has tacitly introduced another premise, the 
premise that there are some individuals that are relevantly similarly who 
receive dissimilar treatment. We shall call this the existence thesis.
Existence Thesis (E): There are some individuals in the actual world 
such that they are relevantly very similar in respects pertaining to the 
condition C specified in (DC), yet who end up in radically different 
eternal destinations.
We shall argue that (E) is groundless and upon sufficient reflection im­
plausible.
There are other possible responses to Sider's argument. One may mo­
tivate a denial of the proportionality principle,3 one may motivate an 
epistemicist response to this problem,4 or one may argue that "whimsical 
generosity" is not objectionable.5 Though we think each of these responses 
plausible, we judge that our response is stronger than any of these re­
sponses because our argument retains all the original premises of Sider's 
argument.
Our arguments works like this: We maintain that God can satisfy the 
requirements of justice described by (DJ) and (P) within the constraints of 
the targeted doctrine of Hell. This may be done by ensuring that (BL) has 
no teeth. That (BL) has no bite is ensured by the falsity of (E).
On the Existence Thesis
In the following we adduce a consideration against (E). Reflection sug­
gests little reason to endorse (E).
Consider the following parable (perhaps best read with a British accent, 
in the style of Monty Python).
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Angel Parable
God is about to create the world. After looking through a large dossier 
of possible worlds, just as he is about to say the magic words "Fiat w" 
Gabriel interrupts, "Ahem, Sir, if you don't mind my saying so don't 
forget to make sure only to actualize a world in which people differ 
sufficiently in respects pertaining to their position in the afterlife."
"What do you mean?" God says "Speak plain English why don't 
you! Preferably King James English . . . just kidding, I do have a sense 
of humor you know."
"Certainly, Sir. It's just that you don't want people so close to one an­
other in respects of salvation that you have to make an arbitrary choice as 
to whether they go to Heaven or Hell, that would smack of injustice."
"Ah, very well, I see what you mean," says God and then is again 
about to issue the Fiat when Michael interrupts, "Um, Lord, pardon me 
for saying so, I'm sure you'll have thought of this, but you also don't 
want to actualize a world in which the gaps are discernable to them. The 
last thing you want is for it to be clear to all who's got an advantage on 
whom. They'll no doubt argue about such things anyway, but as long as 
it's hard to tell no one will have the upper hand. Not to mention the di­
sasters that could occur from people trying to consign the Hell-bound to 
their fate prematurely. It will be hard for such beings not to play God."
"Hmm, very good point. Now before I get started, does anyone else 
have anything they'd like to say," God asks.
Harold then points out, "Actually, you could save yourself the 
trouble—though of course it would be no trouble to you—of looking 
for a world with moral joints between individuals just large enough 
for you to make non-arbitrary decisions yet just small enough for hu­
mans not to see them by picking a world with a gap anywhere below 
a point where people determinately deserve Hell. Then send everyone 
above that point to Heaven. They will get more than they deserve, and 
to varying degrees at that, but no one will have anything to complain 
about, because they'll all get more than they deserve."
"I like it!" says God "I'm glad someone has an eye for efficiency 
around here!"
Sider's inconsistency argument assumes that the actual world is not 
S(oteriologically)-gappy.6 We now question that assumption. Sider says it 
is "manifestly false" that the actual world is S-gappy, for "every morally 
or spiritually relevant factor we encounter in our lives is quite clearly a 
smear."7 That's a pretty confident assertion on a matter which seems to us 
not an easy matter to judge. "But the LORD said to Samuel, 'Do not look 
at his appearance or at his physical stature, because I have refused him. 
For the LORD does not see as man sees; for man looks at the outward ap­
pearance, but the LORD looks at the heart" (1 Samuel 16:7 NKJV). Sider 
looks at the world and sees no S-gaps. He doesn't say what he's looking for 
when he does this. We have no theory about what exactly the S-relevant 
features are according to which one is judged, but we expect that it will be 
quite complex and "hidden from the eyes of man."8
This is a case where absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of 
absence. We must consider the probability that we would see gaps if they
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were there. For if the probability of our seeing gaps conditioned on their 
existence is low, then our not seeing them will not necessarily count as 
evidence against their existence. It is like Plantinga's case of the noseeums, 
the tiny buzzing insects which frequently pester campers. While we have 
a reason to expect that we'd notice, say, an Irish wolfhound in the tent, 
we have no corresponding reason to think we'd spot a noseeum.9 This 
argument is directly parallel to the issue of so-called "skeptical theism" 
in the literature on the problem of evil.10 This is not the place to rehash 
that argument, but suffice it to say that this is a key weakness in Sider's 
argument (especially since the move is on considerably more firm ground 
here than in the case of evil). The assumption that the actual world is not 
S-gappy is essential to his argument, yet he claims to know this contingent 
fact empirically, even though—as the Creation Parable makes clear and 
the noseeum case illustrates—on the traditional account which is under 
fire there is no good reason to expect the gaps to be manifest.
This line of thought is open to the objection that S-relevant features 
supervene on moral features and M-relevant features are continuous. 
This objection, however, only relocates the problem (or perhaps just lo­
cates it). For the original line of reasoning applies just as well to moral 
status. We can observe people's behavior, but not their intentions, mo­
tives, regrets, or a host of factors that determine whether a person has 
the relevant moral characteristics. True, we do sometimes infer people's 
intentions—as best we can—from their observed behavior. But even in 
cases in which this succeeds there are other hidden factors that affect 
moral character. Anyone who has done even a modicum of inner moral 
scrutiny realizes clearly that most moral struggles are within. There is 
a huge difference morally between performing an action on motives of 
which you don't fully approve and deeply regretting it afterwards and 
performing a type-identical action fully endorsing the same motives and 
without any regret.
Furthermore, it seems to us that the features of persons upon which 
moral character supervene are both more fine-grained than beliefs and de­
sires and of a higher order. It is plausible that it is morally blameworthy to 
hold certain beliefs.11 If so, it could be more morally reprehensible to hold 
them to a greater degree. For example, the person that has just enough 
credence to count as believing that members of a certain race are inferior 
is not as badly off morally as someone who feels certain of it, if it is a cer­
tain kind of moral sensitivity on their part which blocks further credence. 
Yet our method of inferring beliefs from behaviors cannot always detect 
the granularity of a belief. For someone living in a racist community the 
disutility of acting contrary to those racist precedents will obscure the dif­
ference between barely believing it and being convinced of it.
Moreover, though our inferences from behavior might reasonably im­
plicate certain beliefs and desires, they will ordinarily not provide insight 
into higher-order states such as whether the individual believes their be­
liefs or desires to be objectionable or desires to have certain beliefs and 
desires. Yet both one's degrees of confidence and one's higher-order states, 
we submit, are surely factors relevant to the assessment of their moral 
character. To illustrate this, we present a contrast between two individuals 
who exhibit identical actions and have the same course-grained mental
profile but form a marked contrast with respect to the finer-grained and 
higher-order considerations we advert to.
Brutal Bart
Brutal Bart goes into his former workplace (where he was recently 
fired), shoots his old boss, takes the petty cash fund, and runs. Bart 
believes he has a right to the money since he'd worked there for a full 
year without a raise. He desired to shoot his boss and take the money 
and believed he could get away with it. He has certitude that his boss 
forfeited his life when he fired him and no reservations about what he 
has done.
Reluctant Ralph
Ralph goes into his former workplace (where he was recently fired), 
shoots his old boss, takes the petty cash fund, and runs. Ralph be­
lieves he has a right to the money since he'd worked there for a full 
year without a raise. He desired to shoot his boss and take the money 
and believed he could get away with it. However, Ralph is just barely 
convinced he has a "right" to the money since he sees that his Boss had 
a legitimate grievance with him. In fact, when he thinks about it, he 
believes this belief is probably not justified, though it persists. Further­
more, he believes his desire to do this is one he should not have and 
in fact desires not to have this desire. After he has done it, he deeply 
regrets it, believing it to have been a wicked act and desiring that he 
could undo his wrong.
We think this contrast represents the possibility of undetectable mental 
bases of moral character which provide reason to doubt our ability to 
make the kinds of judgments necessary to support Sider's smear thesis. 
We conclude that Sider's "smear" thesis is thus a dubious and unargued 
assumption.
There is, however, another reply to our argument that only invokes 
the possibility of S-gappiness. Sider thinks that the mere possibility of S- 
gappiness is sufficient to undermine either the traditional conception of 
Hell or the conception of divine justice. He reasons:
One . . . wonders what happens in the possible worlds in which gaps 
are absent. My opponent might claim that gaps are metaphysical­
ly necessary, or, more plausibly, claim that in worlds without gaps 
some component of the binary conception of hell would need to be 
abandoned. I am somewhat inclined to object that it would be unbe­
coming of God to use a criterion that would allow for possible cases 
of injustice if applied in every possible world, even if those cases do 
not actually arise.12
There are a number of things to say in reply to this. First, since God exists 
in every possible world (or so we shall assume) and has his properties 
essentially, it follows from the fact that God has overriding reasons not to 
allow non-S-gappy worlds that it's not even metaphysically possible for a
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world to fail to be S-gappy.13 There is no manifest problem with this sug­
gestion. Second, and more importantly, there is nothing morally suspect 
about using a criterion to adjudicate between actual cases that can admit 
of borderline cases. If I am to distribute medicine to large groups of people 
and I use a criterion that gets the actual cases right then the possibility of 
that criterion leading to morally objectionable distributions in other non­
actual situations is just not relevant to the actual morality of my action. 
This is especially obvious when I know  that it will get the actual cases 
right. We judge that a similar case applies to God's use of a criterion based 
on a moral matter of degree. As long as there are no actual violations of 
morality, there are no violations of morality.
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NOTES
1. Faith and Philosophy Vol. 19, No. 1 (2002), pp. 58-68.
2. Ibid., p. 59.
3. There are independent reasons to question Proportionality. Proportion­
ality rules out lottery-generated blessings. That's counter-intuitive. Egalitarian 
principles of distributive justice might argue that divisible sums won in lot­
teries be shared, but to deny the fortunate possession of an unshareable prize 
would be a case of “leveling down" which is almost universally rejected as a 
correct principle in ethical theory. See D. Parfit, “Equality or Priority" (Lindley 
Lecture, University of Kansas Press), in The Ideal o f Equality, ed. M. Clayton and 
A. Williams (New York: St. Martin's Press, and London: Macmillan, 1995).
4. Epistemicism is a view about the nature of vagueness which holds that 
vagueness is a result of ignorance. For instance, suppose Bob is a borderline 
case of baldness. It is unclear whether Bob is bald or not. Epistemicism ex­
plains that this inability to judge whether Bob is bald or not arises because we 
lack knowledge about the precise cut off for 'bald.' For details and defense see 
Timothy Williamson, Vagueness (New York: Routledge, 1994). An epistemicist 
response to the current problem would hold that we are ignorant of the pre­
cise cut off regarding the criterion God uses to decide eternal fate. One might 
think: “Well, epistemicism is intuitively crazy at first glance, but look at all the 
problems it solves. Sider's argument is just another instance in which epis­
temicism solves an intractable problem."
5. If one thought that a consequence of God's actualizing a world would 
be that there would be borderline individuals with respect to their soteriologi- 
cal properties then one should think God may decide to send to Hell only the 
“super-damnable." Admittedly there is higher-order vagueness: where's the 
cut off between the super-damnable and the not superdamnable? But if the 
choice is between actualizing a world in which only the superdamnable go to 
the Hell and the rest go to Heaven or not, then if the world actualizes other 
tremendous goods, creating that world wins the day.
6. See below (pp. 326-27) for a discussion of Sider's different claim that 
the mere possibility of S-gappiness is sufficient to raise difficulties with the 
targeted conception of Hell.
7. Sider, p. 65.
8. This borrows a phrase from famed nineteenth-century Freemason 
Thomas Smith Webb. The full quote is a gem: “[A]nd although our thoughts,
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words and actions, may be hidden from the eyes of man, yet that All-Seeing 
Eye, whom the Sun, Moon and Stars obey, and under whose watchful care 
even comets perform their stupendous revolutions, pervades the inmost re­
cesses of the human heart, will reward us according to our merits." Thomas 
Smith Webb, The Freemasons Monitor or Illustrations o f Masonry (Salem, MA: 
Cushing and Appleton, 1821), p. 66.
9. For a thorough discussion of this literature see Alvin Plantinga, War­
ranted Christian Belief, (OUP: 2001), 465ff. See especially the papers referenced 
at 466n.10.
10. For a recent defense of “skeptical theism" see Michael Bergmann and 
Michael Rea, “In Defence Of Sceptical Theism," Australasian Journal o f Philoso­
phy Vol. 83, No. 2 (June 2005), pp. 241-51.
11. For a fairly detailed investigation of this, see James Montmarquet, 
Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (Rowman and Littlefield, 1993).
12. Sider, pp. 64-65.
13. Notice that there are lots of things that might at first have appeared 
to be possible that aren't if there is a necessarily existing God who has all 
powers essentially. To turn this into an objection to theism would require a 
very strong tie between conceivability and possibility. In Conee and Sider's 
Riddles o f Existence (OUP, 2005), chapter three, an objection is raised from 
“vanishing possibilities" to the existence of a necessary being. The objection 
is that lots of apparent possibilities vanish if there is a necessary being. A full 
response to this objection is beyond the scope of this paper, but notice that 
this argument cuts both ways: if a necessary being does not exist, then by S5 
modal reasoning, a necessary being is impossible, but it seems possible. Fur­
thermore, any interesting metaphysical thesis should be metaphysically nec­
essary and thus make its apparently possible rivals metaphysically impos­
sible, e.g., gunk theory or true atomic theory. Finally, we might have thought 
it possible for water to be XYZ. The moral of the story is that metaphysical 
possibility is not perspicuous.
